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 ABSTRACT  
 
This paper examines the macroeconomic structural differences of the free floating exchange rate 
regime and the managed float exchange rate regime focusing on the Korean economy, and 
compares it to the two benchmark economies, Japan and Australia.  Korea’s shift to the free floating 
exchange rate regime from the managed float exchange rate regime came after the 1997 economic 
crisis.  Korea’s exchange rate policy provides a unique opportunity to study the different behaviors 
or roles, if any, of managed float and free floating exchange rate regimes.  Based on a simple 
monetary model, we find that the exchange rates of Korea are more sensitive to the economic 
fundamentals under the free floating regime than under the managed float regime.  Impulse 
response analysis shows that exchange rate pass-through into domestic variables, especially inflation 
rate, has a bigger short-term impact under the floating regime than under the managed regime.  This 
finding is consistent with the view that the managed (or fixed) regime provides the domestic price 
stability necessary for the economic growth for the developing countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
본 논문은 한국의 근본적인 거시경제변
수가 두 가지 다른 환율제도(자유변동 환율
제도와 시장평균 환율제도)하에서 어떻게
다르게 반응하는가를 분석ᆞ연구한다. 이
와 아울러 같은 기간 동안의 일본과 호주의
거시경제구조에 대한 비교 분석도 곁들인
다. 한국은 1997년의 경제위기를 전후하여
환율정책을 시장평균 환율제도에서 자유변
동 환율제도로 전환하였다. 이 시점을 계기
로 한 한국의 외환정책 변경은 두 가지 환율
제도를 비교 분석하는 데 아주 좋은 기회를
제공한다. 화폐경제이론에 기초한 환율결
정 모델을 사용하여 대미환율과 거시경제
 변수에 대한 관계를 분석해 본 결과, 대미 
환율은 시장평균 환율제도하에서보다 자
유변동 환율제도하에서 근본적인 거시경
제변수에 더 민감하게 반응하는 것으로 
나타났다. Impulse Response Analysis 분석
결과에 의하면, 환율변동이 물가상승률에 
미치는 영향은 시장평균 환율제도하에서
보다 자유변동 환율제도하에서 단기적으
로 더 큰 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결론은 
개발도상국가에서는 안정적인 관리 환율
제도가 경제성장을 위해 필요하다는 일반
적인 견해와 일치하는 것이다. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
After the recent Asian economic crisis of 1997, many Asian countries, including 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea among others, were forced to devalue their 
local currencies and resorted to a free floating exchange rate system.  They 
abandoned the hard or soft peg exchange rate systems to adopt the free floating 
exchange rate system mainly because of their inability to maintain the pegs.  It is 
widely believed that fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes are ultimately destined 
to collapse, thus resulting in an economic crisis.  Therefore, the solution to economic 
crises lies in increased exchange rate flexibility in the long term (Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1995, Larrain and Velasco 2001). 
Even with the possibility of the ultimate failure of the fixed exchange regime, 
many developing and emerging countries still favor fixed exchange rate regime to 
the flexible exchange regime.  The advantages of the fixed regime, especially for 
developing countries, are well summarized in Frankel (2003).  They are: providing a 
nominal anchor to monetary policy, encouraging trade and investment, precluding 
competitive depreciation and avoiding speculative bubbles.  In short, the fixed 
exchange regimes provide the stability that the developing countries need to 
maintain their economic growth.  However, as the countries manage to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate with occasional interventions, it is inevitable that a large gap 
arises between the fixed exchange rate and economic fundamentals such as 
expansionary monetary policy, low foreign reserves and current account deficits to 
support the fixed rate.  When this gap finally collapses, it brings the sudden and 
violent currency depreciation which results in economic crisis. This line of reasoning 
is the basis of numerous economic crisis analyses such as Flood and Garber (1984) for 
the first generation crisis model, Obstfeld (1994) for the second generation crisis 
model, and Flood and Marion (2002) for the third generation or twin crisis model.  
Frankel (2003) also provides four advantages of the free floating exchange rate 
regime: independent monetary policy, automatic adjustment to trade shocks, 
seigniorage and lender of last resort ability, and ability to avoid speculative attacks.  
However, as Frankel points out, it is not completely clear whether the majority of 
developing countries can, or are willing to take advantage of the free floating 
exchange rate regime. 
There is an increasing trend for many developing countries to adopt free floating 
exchange rate regimes after economic crisis.  However, in reality, the officially 
declared exchange rate regimes often times are not what they claim to be.  Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) investigated 39 countries of wide geographic differences during the 
period of January 1970-November 1999, and found that countries that claim to float 
their exchange rates mostly do not.  It is the so-called phenomena of the “fear of 
floating.”  From this evidence, it is clear that many developing countries prefer to 
have their exchange rates stable regardless of their officially declared exchange rate 
regimes.  This then begs the question, why do they prefer to have fixed exchange rate 
regime to the flexible regime?  It is widely believed that the fixed exchange rate 
regime will provide domestic relative price stability and thus promote higher 
economic growth.  However, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) show results 
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quite to the contrary.  They found that the floating exchange rate regimes, other 
things being equal, actually yield higher economic growth than either the 
intermediate regimes or the fixed regimes.  Dissatisfied with the official de jure IMF 
classifications of exchange rate regimes for each country, they developed their own 
exchange rate regime classification, de facto classification, for the period from 1974-
2000, and found that among non-industrialized countries, the flexible exchange rate 
regime provides higher economic growth.  Meanwhile, among the industrialized 
countries, exchange rate regimes do not appear to explain the economic growth, one 
way or another, in a statistically significant manner. 
This paper investigates the macroeconomic structural differences of the Korean 
economy under the free floating exchange rate regime after the economic crisis and 
compares to the managed float exchange rate regime before the crisis.  Baxter and 
Stockman (1989), and Flood and Rose (1995) studied the relationship between 
exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic volatilities, and found that 
macroeconomic volatilities are not particularly dependent on exchange rate regimes.  
This paper follows a similar line of research and focuses on a single country, Korea.  
More specifically, we are interested in determining whether the Korean exchange 
rates are more closely following economic fundamentals, comparing two different 
exchange rate regimes in recent years.  Even with the well-documented difficulties of 
explaining exchange movement, there are at least two reasons that it is a worthwhile 
effort to study the Korean exchange rate based on the standard monetary model of 
exchange rate determination.  First, this paper focuses on Korean exchange rate 
regimes.  The Korean economy has grown rapidly in the last 30 years.  Even with the 
recent economic crisis and setbacks, Korea is currently the 12th largest economy in 
the world and a model economy for achieving greater economic success.  Korea 
attained the world’s exclusive economic status by joining the OECD in 1996, and 
becoming a key player in international trade.  Most of the previously mentioned 
exchange rate determination analyses focused on major currencies in developed 
countries.  Major currencies in developed countries have mostly been freely 
determined by the market since the collapse of the Bretton Woods Accord in 1973, 
and their data is readily available.  This paper investigates similar exchange rate 
behavior focusing on the small developing Korean Won-U.S. Dollar nominal 
exchange rates.  Second, Korean exchange rate regimes provide a recent opportunity 
to study the different behaviors or roles, if any, of a managed float and a floating 
regimes in the same economy.  Since the regime change has occurred in a relatively 
recent period, it provides a unique opportunity to empirically verify the advantages 
or disadvantages of different regimes as postulated by Frankel (2003).  More 
specifically, one of the advantages of the fixed rate regime is the stability of the 
domestic price level, which in turn leads to higher economic growth.  We will 
investigate the effect of exchange rate pass-through to domestic variables such as 
inflation rate under the two different regimes.  The results of this paper provide a 
useful guideline for emerging economies to properly set their exchange rate systems 
to achieve stable economic growth. 
The next section introduces a simple monetary model of exchange rate 
determination based on purchasing power parity.  Section 3 describes the data set 
and presents empirical results.  Section 4 concludes the paper with some suggestions 
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on the future direction of the current study. 
 
 
II.  Theoretical Framework of Exchange Rate Determination 
 
 
It is well documented that the exchange rate is very difficult to predict using any 
theoretical models of exchange rate determination, first studied by Meese and Rogoff 
(1983).  They tested the 1970s floating exchange rates for three major currencies, and 
found that none of the theoretical exchange rate determination models could 
outperform a simple random walk model in the root mean square criteria.  In short, 
they found that exchange rates closely follow a random walk process, and is 
unpredictable during their sample period.  A recent study by Cheung, Chinn and 
Pascual (2002) affirms the Meese and Rogoff (1983) result that any specific model or 
theory is not very successful in improving exchange rate predictability.  There have 
been other studies, such as Mark (1995), Chinn and Meese (1995) and MacDonald 
and Taylor (1994), claiming modest success in predicting exchange rate movements, 
but their results are largely limited to particular periods or currencies.  None of their 
results are robust enough to consistently predict exchange rates.  Engel and West 
(2003) approached the exchange rate determination through reverse causation. They 
claim that they were able to predict economic fundamentals using the exchange rates 
for the G7 countries.  Viewing the exchange rate as an asset price influenced by 
future expectations, they demonstrated that the exchange rate follows a process 
arbitrarily close to the random walk if (1) at least one of the underlying fundamental 
variables is I(1), and (2) the discount factor is near one.  If expectations reflect 
information about future fundamentals, the exchange rate will likely be useful in 
predicting these future economic fundamentals. 
The theoretical framework of our model is based on the simple monetary model 
used by various authors including MacDonald and Taylor (1994), Mark (1995), 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Mark and Sul (1999), and Wu and Chen (2001), among 
others.  This model consists of four behavioral equilibrium equations: the domestic 
and foreign money market equilibriums, the purchasing power parity condition and 
the uncovered interest parity condition. 
 
tttt iypm φλ −=−      domestic money market equilibrium                                           (1) 
****
tttt iypm φλ −=−     foreign (ROW) money market equilibrium                                (2) 
*
ttt pps −=            purchasing power parity (PPP)                                                    (3) 
ttttt ssEii −=− +1*       uncovered interest parity (UIP)                                                    (4) 
 
where, 
 ( )*tt mm : domestic (foreign) money supply in natural log ( )*tt pp : domestic (foreign) price level in natural log ( )*tt yy : domestic (foreign) GDP in natural log 
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( )*tt ii : domestic (foreign) interest rate 
ts  : nominal exchange rate (local currency price of one foreign currency) in 
natural log 
1+tt sE : expectation of 1+ts  at time t. 
10 << λ : income elasticity to money demand 
0>φ : interest semi-elasticity to money demand 
 
From equations (1) to (3), we have 
 ( ) ( ) ( )**** tttttttttt iifiiyymms −+=−+−−−= φφλ                                                                    (5) 
 
where ( )** ttttt yymmf −−−= λ  is the economic fundamentals consisting of domestic 
and foreign countries.   
By substituting the UIP equation (4) into equation (5), the equilibrium condition is: 
 ( ) ( )ttttttt ssEiifs −=−=− +1* φφ                                                                                     (6) 
 
Under the rational expectations hypothesis with no bubble solutions for the 
exchange rate process, we will have the fundamental solution for ts  as: 
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Exchange rate is expressed as the discounted value of the future economic 
fundamentals.  This is a characteristic of the monetary model viewing the exchange 
rate as the asset price of the future economic fundamentals.  Assume that the 
economic fundamentals series { }tf  follows a driftless random walk process, ( )1I .   
Then, we have ( )1~ Ist , ( )0~ IstΔ .  Since tttt vsEs += ++ 11 , where tv  is a white noise 
forecasting error, nominal exchange rate and fundamentals, { }tt fs , , must be 
cointegrated by equation (6).   Rearrange equation (6) to construct the econometric 
model of the exchange rate changes and fundamentals such that: 
 
ttt zs εββ ++=Δ + 101                                                                                                             (8) 
 
where ( )*ttttt iifsz −=−= φ  is the nominal exchange rate deviations from the 
economic fundamentals.  We expect 01 <β  because when ts  is undervalued relative 
to the  economic fundamentals ( ( )tt fs −  increases), nominal exchange rate should 
correct downward (appreciation: tsΔ  decreases) to restore equilibrium. 
This is the basic model used to perform the exchange rate forecasting ability 
based on the monetary model.  This model has been used by MacDonald and Taylor 
(1994), Mark (1995) to test the predictability of exchange rates.  They claimed modest 
success in predicting exchange rates for a longer horizon.  Mark and Sul (2001) use 
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panel data set of 19 industrialized countries while Wu and Chen (2001) estimated 
equation (8) using nonlinear Kalman filter allowing for the time-varying nature of 
the slope parameter.    
In this paper, we adopt the same model for the purpose of linking economic 
fundamentals to the exchange rates.  However, we would like to extend the analysis 
to examine equation (8) on how economic fundamentals explain the exchange rates 
on different exchange rate regimes.  Based on the reasons explained in the 
introduction, the Korean exchange rate policy is an ideal candidate for this study. 
 
 
Ⅲ. Korean Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
The Korean exchange rate system has evolved through several stages in recent 
history.  Until 1980, the government strictly regulated foreign exchange transactions, 
and the Korean Won was pegged to the U.S. dollar.  In 1980, as a result of the 
introduction of a multiple-basket pegged exchange rate system, the Korean Won 
started to float in reflection of general trends in the international foreign exchange 
markets, even though it was still tightly managed by the government.   The market 
average exchange rate (MAR) system, as a variant of managed floating exchange rate 
regime, was first adopted in March 1990.  Since then, the Korean Won-U.S. Dollar rate 
began to be determined on the basis of underlying demand and supply conditions of 
the interbank market, although daily fluctuations were limited within certain bands.  
However, the Bank of Korea still intervened frequently, and the exchange rate was 
still not completely determined by the market.  In late 1997, the Asian economic crisis 
broke out and Korea turned to the IMF for rescue efforts. Taking advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the economic crisis, Korea has accelerated the speed of 
the economic restructuring including the capital account liberalization.  Korea 
shifted to a free-floating exchange rate system on December 1997.  The ceiling on 
foreign investment in Korean equities was entirely abolished in May 1998, and the 
local bond markets and money markets were completely opened to foreign investors.  
In June 1998, the Korean government announced a plan to liberalize all foreign 
exchange transactions in two stages.  The first stage of liberalization took effect on 
April 1, 1999 with the introduction of a new Foreign Exchange Transaction Act.  The 
second stage of liberalization took effect on January 2001. The remaining ceilings on 
current account transactions by individuals have been eliminated. 
 
 
1. Data Description 
 
All our data comes from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (on a CD-
ROM).  Data frequency is listed on a monthly basis except for the GDP and GDP 
deflator series, which are available only on a quarterly basis.  We converted the 
quarterly series into monthly frequencies by linearly interpolating quarterly 
observations into monthly observations. 
We used the bilateral nominal exchange rates per U.S. Dollars for Australia, Japan 
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and South Korea for the period of January 1980 to December 2003.  These exchange 
rates are nominal domestic currency prices per U.S. Dollar at the end of each month.  
The Japanese Yen and Australian Dollar are introduced here as benchmarks for 
Korean exchange rate regimes.  Japan is one of Korea’s largest trading partners, and 
Korea has sustained a chronic trade deficit with Japan.  In addition to the close 
economic relationship between Korean and Japan, the Japanese Yen has been freely 
floating since the collapse of the Bretton Woods Accord.  As Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) observed, the Japanese Yen serves as one of the reserve currencies of the 
world.  Therefore, its free floating regime characteristics may be different from those 
of small developing economies.  In this regard, Australia is chosen because the 
Australian Dollar is also freely floating, but because the Australian economy is much 
smaller than that of Japan, it more closely resembles typical small developing 
economies.  In the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) study, the Australian Dollar is used as a 
benchmark currency for the floating exchange rate regimes.  Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) report that the probability of the Australian Dollar fluctuating within the 
prescribed 2.5% band for the free floating regime was about 70% during the monthly 
period of January 1984 to November 1999.  Therefore, we also used the Australian 
Dollar as the benchmark currency for a small open economy to study the 
characteristics of the free floating exchange rate of the Korean Won. 
Other economic variables in our analysis are as follows: Money supply: M2 
measure of nominal money supply.  Interest rate: short-term government bond rates 
for Australia and Japan, short-term (90 days) deposit rate for Korea, and 3-month U.S. 
Treasury bill rate.  General price level: manufacturing output prices for Australia, 
consumer price indices for Japan, Korea and the U.S.  Reserves are measured as total 
reserves minus gold in U.S. dollar terms. 
We divide our data into three periods.  The first period is from January 1980 to 
the beginning of the Korean economic crisis, September 1997 (period 1).  During this 
period, Korean exchange rates were managed and controlled by the Bank of Korea.  
The second period is the crisis period, October 1997 to September 1998, when the 
first round of financial restructuring was completed following the IMF 
recommendations to recover from the economic crisis.  During the crisis period, the 
nominal exchange rates were unstable and they fluctuated widely.  Thus, we exclude 
this period from our analysis.  The last period, starting October 1998 to the end of the 
sample period, December 2003, is the post-crisis free floating exchange rate regime 
(period 2).  Korean exchange rates were allowed to move freely during this period 
with minimal market intervention from the banking authority. 
 
 
2. Exchange Rates and Economic Fundamentals 
 
First, we will examine the volatilities of two closely related variables for the 
exchange rate regimes, the nominal exchange rate and the foreign reserves.  We 
compare the rate of return volatilities measured as the standard deviation of the 
percentage change of the bilateral nominal exchange rates and foreign reserves so 
that, ( ttttt sssSS Δ=−=− −− 11loglog , ttttt rrrRR Δ=−=− −− 11loglog ), where ts is the 
natural log of the nominal exchange rate tS , and tr  is the natural log of foreign  
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<Table 1> Volatilities for Nominal Exchange Rates and Reserves for Each Period 
 
Managed Float Regime, Period 1 
January 1980 – September 1997 
Free Floating Regime, Period 2 
October 1998 – December 2003 
 
tsΔ  trΔ  tsΔ  trΔ  
Korea 0.8685 7.5047 2.6289 1.6631 
Japan 3.3865 3.4587 3.4807 2.4418 
Australia 2.8541 9.4771 3.2037 7.3335 
 Test Statistics for 2220 : KJASH σσσ ==  
Bartlett 313.920(0.0000)   185.963(0.0000) 4.4275(0.1093) 126.71(0.00) 
Levene 80.4854(0.0000) 32.3659(0.0000) 1.4095(0.2471) 25.3006(0.00) 
Brown-
Forsythe 
72.1956(0.0000) 
 
32.2831(0.0000) 
 
1.4737(0.2320) 
 
20.5717(0.00) 
 
Note: Test statistics are for the null hypothesis that volatilities are the same for all three countries.  p-values 
are in parenthesis. 
 
 
reserves, 
tR .  Table 1 compares the return volatilities of three exchange rates for two 
distinct periods, before the economic crisis for the managed float regime and after 
the economic crisis for the free floating regimes.  Volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of each variable.  This table also provides three different, yet 
similar test statistics to test the equality of the variance of the returns of nominal 
exchange rates during this period.  These statistics are for the three way equality tests. 
Table 1 clearly shows that the Korean Won is much less volatile during the 
managed float regime, and its volatility is much smaller than that of Australian 
Dollar and Japanese Yen.  During the free float regime, the Korean Won is still less 
volatile than those other exchange rates, but their difference is now statistically 
insignificant with p–values ranging from 0.11 to 0.25.  All three test statistics reject 
the equivalence of return variances during Korean Won’s managed float regime, 
while all three statistics accept that their volatilities are statistically equivalent under 
the free floating regime.  The Korean Won fluctuates as freely as other floating 
exchange rate currencies after adopting the free floating regime in period 2.  Korean 
foreign reserve holdings are much more volatile under the managed float than those 
of free floating period.  This is an expected result that under the managed float, 
reserves are often used to maintain stable nominal exchange rates (Interest rate is 
another policy tool to manage exchange rates).  Therefore, by comparing the reserve 
volatilities of two periods, we observe that the reserves have become increasingly 
stabilized under the recent free floating exchange regime, especially for Korea. 
We can also observe from this table that while the nominal exchange rates for all 
three countries have been more volatile in recent years than in the 1980s and the late 
1990s, the volatilities of foreign reserves show the opposite trend.  Korean exchange 
rates have become more volatile and reserves have become more stabilized because of 
her exchange rate regime changes.  In order to investigate whether there have been any 
other macroeconomic regime shifts causing other currencies, including the Korean  
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<Table 2> Volatilities for Different Periods for Nominal Exchange Rates and 
Reserves ( 22,
2
1,0 : iiH σσ = )  
 
Korea Japan Australia 
 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 
tsΔ  0.8685 2.6289 3.3865 3.4807 2.8541 3.2037 
F-test 9.1617(0.0000) 1.0563(0.8298) 1.2600(0.3082) 
Bartlett 141.4332(0.0000) 0.0669(0.7959) 1.2268(0.2680) 
trΔ  7.5047 1.6631 3.4587 2.4418 9.4771 7.3335 
F-test 20.3638(0.0000) 2.0063(0.0005) 1.6700(0.0109) 
Bartlett 106.8419(0.0000) 9.1142(0.0025) 5.1377(0.0234) 
Note: Test statistics are for the null hypothesis that volatilities are the same for all three countries.  p-values 
are in the parenthesis. 
 
 
Won to be more volatile in recent years, we compared the equivalence of return 
volatility for two periods.  Table 2 reports the test statistics for the volatilities for 
nominal exchange and foreign reserve before and after the Korean economic crisis.  
Table 2 shows the expected results.  The Japanese Yen, serving as the reserve 
currency for the world shows little change in its volatility during these two periods 
even with the recent Asian economic crisis.  Test statistics also show little evidence of 
changes of the Yen volatility.  The Australian Dollar also shows that the volatilities 
remain the same between two periods.  The Korean Won, on the other hand, shows 
strong evidence of volatility change during this period.  Table 2 also reports foreign 
reserve volatilities for each country for two periods, and its test statistics.  We reject 
the null hypothesis that reserve volatilities remain the same for the entire period for 
all three countries.  We can see that the reserves for all three countries have become 
much more stable in recent years than in the 1980s and early to mid 1990s.  We also 
observe that the reduction of the reserve volatility is much more noticeable for Korea 
than for other two countries.  The main reason for the stability of the reserves for 
Korea is the exchange rate regime changes from the actively managed regime to the 
free floating regime. 
The exchange rate volatilities can be best illustrated using the figures.  To avoid 
cluttering the figures, Figure 1 plots the nominal exchange rate returns for two 
currencies, the Korean Won (solid line) and the Japanese Yen (broken line) against the 
U.S. Dollar for the entire sample period.  The Australian Dollar returns could also be 
plotted in the same figure, but it is not included in Figure 1 to simplify the 
presentation. 
The Japanese Yen is more volatile during Period 1 when the Korean Won was 
under the managed float regime.  During Period 2 when the Korean Won is under 
the floating exchange rate system, the currency volatilities of the two countries 
appear to be quite similar, and they are not statistically different as seen from Table 1. 
Another measure of contrasting different exchange rate regimes is the change of  
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[Figure 1] Monthly Percentage Changes of the Nominal Exchanges per U.S. Dollar 
Monthly Changes of Nominal Exchange Rates for Korean Won and Japan Yen
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
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[Figure 2] Monthly Percentage Changes of the Reserves for Korea and Japan 
Monthly Reserve Changes for Korea and Japan
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
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<Table 3> Exchange Rate Behavior ( tsΔ ):  ARCH(1) LM Test  
Country Korea Japan Australia 
Period All Period 1 Period 2 All All 
F-statistic 
 
27.4152 
(0.0000) 
6.3088 
(0.0128) 
0.7890 
(0.3783) 
0.9362 
(0.3341) 
0.3684 
(0.5444) 
Asymptotic 2χ  
 
25.0881 
(0.0000) 
6.1825 
(0.0129) 
0.8064 
(0.3692) 
0.9398 
(0.3323) 
0.3705 
(0.5427) 
Note: This table reports only ARCH(1) LM tests.  Different lag lengths of ARCH model produce 
qualitatively similar results.  p-values are in the parenthesis.  
 
 
the reserves.  Reserves are often used to control and manage nominal exchange rates 
under the fixed and managed exchange rate regimes.  Figure 2 plots the volatility of 
reserve changes for Japan (broken line) and Korea (solid line).  It is very clear that the 
Korean reserves were much more volatile than that of Japan during the managed 
float regime of Period 1, and they are also more volatile under the managed float 
regime than under the free floating regime.  This shows the clear evidence of 
exchange rate management schemes.  While there are criticisms that Korean 
exchange rates are still managed and controlled by the central bank, the reserve 
volatility tells otherwise.  The recent volatility of the Korean nominal exchange rate 
shows very similar characteristics of other free floating exchange rates.  In fact, 
Korean reserves remain relatively stable, and exchange rates are comparably more 
volatile during this period.  Australia has relatively volatile reserve changes 
throughout the period.  In fact, even with the free floating exchange rate regime, the 
probability of reserve changes stay within 2.5% band is only about 50% by Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002).  Australian central bank intervention is very active even with free 
floating exchange rate policy.  According to their study, Japan maintains the most 
stable reserves together with Singapore.  The Korean reserve levels were highly 
volatile during the managed regime, but her reserve volatility has decreased 
significantly under the free floating regime.  Korean reserve volatility is even more 
stable than those of Japan after the economic crisis of Period 2.  Table 1 also reports 
the test statistics for the equality of reserves volatilities for three countries, but they 
are all rejected for all period.  Korean reserves remain more stable than those of free 
floating regimes of Australia.  Absolute comparison of the reserve volatilities does 
not seem to be a good measure of distinguishing exchange rate regimes for these 
three countries. 
Instead of comparing the volatilities of different countries, it is more meaningful 
to compare the reserve volatilities for the different time periods.  From Table 2 
statistics, we can see that the reserve volatilities have reduced significantly in Period 
2 compared to those of Period 1 for all three countries.  Since Korea has changed her 
exchange regime from Period 1 to Period 2, the reserve volatility of Korea has 
reduced dramatically. 
Exchange rates, like many other asset prices, often show the pattern of ARCH 
behavior in their evolutions.  Before we specify and estimate the econometric model 
of Equation (8), we need to investigate the behavior of our sample currencies.  Table 
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3 is a summary statistic for the ARCH residuals for the three currencies.  
 The Korean Won shows the ARCH residuals for Period 1 and for the entire 
period, while there is no evidence of ARCH residuals during the free floating Period 
2.  Even though the analysis periods exclude the crisis period of October 1997 to 
December 1998, there are several episodes of ARCH residuals (persistent volatilities) 
under the managed float regime during the late 1980s and the middle of 1990s 
leading to the economic crisis.  Australian Dollar and Japanese Yen do not show the 
ARCH residuals either for the entire period or for two periods separately.  It is 
interesting to observe that the ARCH residuals appear only during the managed 
exchange rate regime. 
The following two figures, Figures 3 and 4, show that the exchange rates are 
widely fluctuating around the deviations from the economic fundamentals ( tz  is 
standardized to have mean zero) for Korea and Japan, and it is not an easy task to 
predict the exchange rates using economic fundamentals.  The relationship between 
exchange rates and the fundamentals for Australia show similar patterns to other 
countries, but it is not shown here to conserve space.  Meese and Rogoff (1983) have 
shown that none of the theoretical exchange rate determination models outperform a 
simple random walk model in the root mean square criteria.  Our objective here is 
not to predict the exchange rate using the economic fundamentals, but to investigate 
the causal relationship of the economic fundamentals to the nominal exchange rates 
focusing on the exchange rate regime shifts of the Korean Won, and compare it to 
other flexible exchange rate regimes. 
The basic econometric model to examine the relationship between exchange rates 
and economic fundamentals is the equation (8) from the monetary model introduced 
in Section 2.  Table 4 shows the OLS estimation results for three countries.  Since the 
Korean Won shows the ARCH(1) behavior from Table 3, we also estimated the 
equation (8) for Korea by GARCH(1,1) model and present the results in Table 5. 
 
[Figure 3] Economic Fundamentals and the Nominal Exchange Rates for Korea 
Relationship between Economic Fundamentals and Exchange rates for Korea
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[Figure 4] Economic Fundamentals and the Nominal Exchange Rates for Japan 
Relationship between Economic Fundamentals and Exchange rates for Japan
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<Table 4> OLS Estimation: ttt zs εββ ++=Δ + 101   
  Korea Japan Australia 
0β  7.6374 (1.8104)*** 20.3091 (9.7455)** -4.8247 (4.0508) 
1β  -1.2151 (0.2961)*** -1.8436 (0.8696)** -0.6741 (0.5890) 
Period 1 
(210) 
 
 SSR 146.7716 2345.6732 1706.1781 
0β  37.3255 (18.7351)** 55.6487 (32.9761)* -12.8023 (20.3014) 
1β  -6.2151 (3.0986)** -5.4044 (3.1894)* -1.6037 (2.5256) 
Period 2 
(55) 
 
 SSR 358.8634 640.8513 546.2578 
0β  8.8816(2.9107)*** 8.3921 (5.3762) -2.8878 (2.2715) 
1β  -1.4375(0.4772)*** -0.7903 (0.4873) -0.3869 (0.3184) 
Both periods 
(265) 
 
 SSR 535.4058 3042.1483 2258.0679 
F-statistic  7.6836 (0.0006) 2.4306 (0.0900) 0.3263 (0.7219) 
Note: Standard errors in the parenthesis.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  F-statistic tests the structural equivalence of two periods.  p-values in the F-statistics. 
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<Table 5> GARCH(1,1) Estimation: 1101 ++ ++=Δ ttt zs εββ , 2 112 1102 −− ++= ttt σγεαασ ,  
where ( )ttt Var Ω= +12 εσ  and tΩ  is an Information Set at Time t.  
Korea Japan Australia  
Period 1 Period 2 Both periods Both periods Both periods 
0β  7.1204  
(1.4019)*** 
37.4090  
(16.8511)* 
5.2379  
(1.3075)*** 
10.4660  
(5.3132)** 
-1.5484  
(2.3635) 
1β  -1.1268  
(0.2286)*** 
-6.2424  
(2.7726)* 
-0.8281  
(0.2140)*** 
-0.9849  
(0.4760)** 
-0.1943  
(0.3289) 
0α  0.1241  
(0.0409)*** 
1.4185   
(0.8827) 
0.0854   
(0.0258)*** 
21.5476  
(2.1823)*** 
0.4711  
(0.2934) 
1α  0.6585  
(0.1525)*** 
-0.1527  
(0.0556)*** 
0.9250   
(0.0940)*** 
0.0307  
(0.0100)*** 
0.0799  
(0.0448)* 
1γ  0.3388  
(0.0967)*** 
0.9246  
(0.1203)*** 
0.3994  
(0.0371)*** 
-1.0136  
(0.0159)*** 
0.8707  
(0.0702)*** 
Note: Standard errors in the parenthesis.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 
From these results, the Korean Won’s fluctuation in response to the deviations 
from the economic fundamentals has increased significantly from Period 1 to Period 
2 (-1.22 vs. -6.22).  Estimates of both OLS and GARCH show qualitatively similar 
results.  In addition, we can see that the impacts of the deviations from the 
fundamentals to the nominal exchange rates are much bigger in magnitude during 
Period 2 than during Period 1.  From the OLS results, this appears to be common 
phenomena for all three currencies (-6.22 vs. -1.22 for Korea, -5.40 vs. -1.84 for Japan, 
and -1.60 vs. -0.67 for Australia) even though the response to the Australian Dollar is 
not statistically significant for all periods.  This shows that the speed of the nominal 
exchange rate adjustments to the deviations from the economic fundamentals has 
increased in recent years for all three countries.  Since ( )*ttttt iifsz −=−= φ  from 
equation (6), 1β , the slope parameter of tz  to 1ts +Δ , can also be interpreted as the 
sensitivity of the nominal exchange rates to the interest rate differentials.   From 
Table 4, we can see that the Korean exchange rates respond to the deviations from 
the economic fundamentals and interest differentials much more sensitively under 
the free floating regime than under the managed regime.  During Period 1 when the 
Korean Won was under the managed regime, the Japanese Yen had been more 
sensitive to the economic fundamentals and interest rate differentials (-1.22 vs. -1.84).  
However, since the Korean Won has become freely floating during Period 2, it has 
been more sensitive to the economic fundamentals (-6.22 vs. -5.40).  The Australian 
Dollar is not very sensitive to the economic fundamentals.  Table 4 also shows that 
the Korean exchange rate has the greatest sensitivity to the interest rate differentials 
among all three countries.  Chow test statistics are calculated for each country, and 
we reject the null hypothesis of the parameter stability between the two periods for 
the Korean Won due to the regime change in these periods as we expected.  The 
structural relationship between nominal exchange rates and the fundamentals has 
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not significantly changed during these periods for Japan and Australia. 
 
 
3. Exchange Rates and Inflation 
 
We now turn our attention to investigate the impact of the exchange rate pass-
through to the domestic economic variables.  From the purchasing power parity 
condition (PPP) of equation (3), there is a one-to-one relationship between the 
domestic inflation rate and the nominal exchange rate assuming constant foreign 
inflation.  Therefore, we would like to see how the change of the nominal exchange 
rate affects the domestic inflation rate.  This paper focuses on the effects of the 
exchange rate regimes on domestic inflation for the Korean economy in reference to 
the benchmark economies of Japan and Australia.  An important objective of the 
fixed exchange rate regime for a developing economy is to maintain stable domestic 
price levels to help increase foreign trade.  However, the intended objective could 
also prove to be wrong for the developing country.  The rigid exchange regime may 
excessively drain foreign reserves, and it may bring further pressure for depreciation 
and domestic inflation.  The vicious cycle may ultimately result in economic crisis.  
First, we will examine the relationship between inflation and the change of exchange 
rates since the 1990s.  Figure 5 plots these two variables on the time span, inflation 
(solid line) and the return of the nominal exchange rate (broken line).  Figure 6 is a 
scatter gram of these two variables.  In Figure 6, the circle represents the plots under 
the managed exchange regime (1990:03-1997:09) period before the economic crisis, 
while the square represents the plots for the free floating regime (1998:10-2003:12) 
after the economic crisis. 
As we can see from these figures, exchange rates have become much more 
volatile, while the inflation rate has become more stable under the free floating 
regime than under the managed regime.  For the statistical regression analysis, I will 
limit my data for two distinctive periods of exchange rate regimes, from March 1990 
to September 1997 for the market based managed exchange rate regime (MAR 
system) and from October 1998 to December 2003 for the free floating exchange rate.  
We selected the post-crisis period starting from October 1998 when the turmoil of the 
economic crisis had settled down a little bit.  Inflation and exchange rates are 
analyzed using bivariate VAR model focusing on the purchasing power parity of 
Equation (3) with additional exogenous lagged variables of the percentage change of 
money supply ( tmΔ ) and the real GDP growth rate ( trGDPΔ ).  Lag length of two for 
the endogenous variables was chosen according to the Schwarz criteria.  Other lag 
length selection did not change the qualitative relationship between these variables.  
Inflation rate appears to show strong time trend, but the Dickey-Fuller test with time 
trend rejects the unit root hypothesis for Period 1, Period 2 and the two periods 
combined.  Bivariate VAR model may be too simple to analyze the complete 
exchange rate determination model introduced in Section 2, but the main objective of 
this analysis is focusing on the pass-through of the exchange rate to the inflation 
contrasting two different exchange rate regimes.  Therefore, the estimated bivariate 
VAR model is: 
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[Figure 5] Inflation and the Changes of the Korean Exchange Rates 
Inflation and Exchange Rates during 1990s to 2003
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[Figure 6] Scattergram of the Inflation and the Exchange Rate Changes 
Inflation vs. Exchange rate changes
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10 11 1 12 2 13 1 14 2 15 1 16 1 1t t t t t t t ts Infl Infl s s m rGDPβ β β β β β β ε− − − − − −Δ = + + + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +  
20 21 1 22 2 23 1 24 2 25 1 26 1 2t t t t t t t tInfl Infl Infl s s m rGDPβ β β β β β β ε− − − − − −= + + + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +  
 where tt 21 ,εε  are uncorrelated white-noise random shocks. 
 
This model is estimated for two periods separately, and combined for Korea.  
Since Japan and Australia did not experience exchange rate regime changes during 
the period, Japan and Australia are estimated for the entire period.  The following 
table presents estimation results. 
From these results, we can see that exchange rates are largely unaffected by 
domestic inflation for all three countries (Table 6.1).  The exchange rate has a 
significant impact on the domestic inflation rate for Korea for all periods, but 
Japanese Yen and Australian Dollar, free floating currencies, do not have any 
statistically significant impact on their respective domestic inflations (Table 6.2).  
This shows that the Korean economy is more susceptible to exchange rate movement 
than those of Japan and Australia.  However, we can observe that as the Korean 
exchange rate policy moves from managed exchange rate regime to free floating 
regime, the impact of exchange rate to inflation becomes smaller as an evidence of 
exchange rate adjustment mechanism.  As the Korean economy matures with free 
floating exchange rate regime, we expect that the impact of exchange rate to inflation 
will be smaller.  Money supply and real GDP growth rate do not appear to 
contribute to the inflation rate for Korea and Australia.  Real GDP growth is mildly 
inflationary to Japan.   Granger causality tests confirm the causal relationship  
 
<Table 6.1> Exchange Rate Equation 
 
Korea Japan Australia  
Period 1 Period 2 Both periods Both periods Both periods 
0β  0.1872  
(0.2625) 
1.1456  
(0.8856) 
0.0319  
(0.3665) 
-0.1292  
(0.3330) 
-0.5908  
(0.4557) 
1−tInfl  0.0672  
(0.1472) 
-0.7207  
(0.6001) 
-0.0587  
(0.2570) 
-0.3422  
(0.8096) 
-0.2439  
(0.4115) 
2−tInfl  
-0.0835  
(0.1481) 
0.4550  
(0.5528) 
0.0848  
(0.2534) 
0.2119  
(0.8030) 
0.3193  
(0.3981) 
1−Δ ts  0.1791  
(0.0998)* 
0.2126  
(0.1431) 
0.2243  
(0.0867)** 
0.0806  
(0.0847) 
0.0827  
(0.1108) 
2−Δ ts  0.2110  
(0.1023)** 
-0.1027  
(0.1491) 
-0.1556  
(0.0866)* 
0.0294  
(0.0842) 
-0.1974  
(0.1100)* 
1−Δ tm  0.1424  
(0.0562)** 
-0.4882  
(0.2738)* 
-0.0552  
(0.1069) 
-0.3510  
(0.2897) 
0.1252  
(0.2754) 
1trGDP−Δ  -0.1548  
(0.0701)** 
0.1218  
(0.1754) 
0.0082  
(0.0942) 
0.8184  
(0.8522) 
1.2724  
(0.9206) 
Adj 2R  0.1600 0.0473 0.0222 0.0350 0.0804 
Note: Standard errors in the parenthesis.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
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<Table 6.2> Inflation Equation 
 
Korea Japan Australia  
Period 1 Period 2 Both periods Both periods Both periods 
0β  0.2559  
(0.1790) 
0.5415  
(0.2037)*** 
0.2213  
(0.1007)* 
-0.0047  
(0.0345) 
0.1420  
(0.1033) 
1−tInfl  1.3297  
(0.1004)*** 
1.0951  
(0.1383)*** 
1.2768  
(0.0800)*** 
0.9847  
(0.0839)*** 
1.4814  
(0.0933)*** 
2−tInfl  
-0.3724  
(0.1001)*** 
-0.2710  
(0.1272)*** 
-0.3258  
(0.0789)*** 
-0.0297  
(0.0832) 
-0.5618  
(0.0902)*** 
1−Δ ts  0.1423  
(0.0681)** 
0.1040  
(0.0329)*** 
0.1219  
(0.0270)*** 
-0.0073  
(0.0088) 
-0.0325  
(0.0251) 
2−Δ ts  -0.0784  
(0.0698) 
0.0469  
(0.0343) 
0.0128  
(0.0270) 
-0.0028  
(0.0087) 
0.0290  
(0.0249) 
1−Δ tm  -0.0086  
(0.0383) 
-0.0391  
(0.0630) 
-0.0100  
(0.0325) 
0.01759  
(0.0300) 
0.0659  
(0.0624) 
1trGDP−Δ  -0.0287  
(0.0478) 
-0.0229  
(0.0403) 
-0.0205  
(0.0293) 
0.1524  
(0.0883)* 
-0.1084  
(0.0286) 
Adj 2R  0.9390 0.8578 0.9518 0.9716 0.9441 
D-F -5.9601  
(0.0000) 
-3.6254  
(0.0364) 
-3.8386  
(0.0172) 
-4.2230  
(0.0047) 
-3.9280  
(0.0127) 
Note: Standard errors in the parenthesis.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  D-F is Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics for the inflation rate.  p-value is in the 
parenthesis. 
 
 
<Table 6.3> Granger Causality Test Statistics (F-statistics) 
 
Korea Japan Australia Null Hypothesis 
Period 1 Period 2 Both Both Both 
tsΔ  Not Grange cause tInfl  2.5374  
(0.0850) 
7.3884  
(0.0015) 
11.7043  
(0.0000) 
0.8408  
(0.4334) 
1.3663  
(0.2607) 
tInfl  Not Grange cause tsΔ  0.2255  
(0.7986) 
0.6218  
(0.5410) 
0.1558  
(0.8559) 
0.3488  
(0.7061) 
0.2713  
(0.7631) 
Note: * Values in the parenthesis are p-values for F-statistic. 
 
 
between inflation and exchange rate.  Table 6.3 reports Granger causality test 
statistics for each period and the two periods combined, and the whole period for 
Japan and Australia. 
It is interesting to observe that the domestic money supply and the real GDP 
growth rate do not have statistically significant impacts on the inflation rate, and the 
Korean Won depreciation has positively contributed to the inflation rate throughout 
the entire sample period.  From the VAR estimates, we can infer that one percent 
depreciation of the one period lagged Korean Won ( 1ts −Δ ) contributes about 0.12% 
increase of the inflation rate for the entire period.  This could be an unfortunate 
consequence of the small open economy which is heavily dependent on the import 
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of intermediate goods to promote exports.  Currency depreciation would boost 
export, but it also causes worsening terms of trade, and higher import prices of 
intermediate goods triggers higher domestic inflation.  It is more evident that the 
export boosting policy through the managed exchange rate regime was pursued at 
the expense of domestic inflation.  The impact of the currency depreciation to the 
inflation has been reduced to 0.10% under the free floating regime from the 0.14% 
under the managed float regime.  Changing various lag length of tsΔ  did not alter 
the qualitative relationship between the inflation and the exchange rate change.  As 
expected from VAR results, Japan and Australia do not show statistically significant 
Granger causality between exchange rate and inflation. 
Having established the causal relationship between exchange rate and inflation, 
we would like to see the impact of external shocks of one variable to one another.  
Figures 7 and 8 are impulse response functions (IRF) and accumulated response 
functions (ARF) for Period 1 and Period 2 using the Cholesky decomposition for two 
years (24 months).  Since Cholesky decomposition is sensitive to the order of shocks 
to the VAR system, we produced two sets of IRF and ARF by rotating shock 
orderings.  These two sets of response functions are remarkably similar to the point 
of being virtually identical.   
Figure 7 and 8 are IRF (upper panel) and ARF (lower panel) using the shock 
ordering of ( ),t ts InflΔ .  The lower-left corner of IRF and ARF are responses of 
inflation to the one standard deviation shock of the nominal exchange rates.  Under 
the managed exchange rate regime (Figure 7), the impulse responses and 
accumulated responses are quite mild in magnitude, and they are statistically 
insignificant.  Under the free-floating regime (Figure 8), the initial impact is relatively 
large and statistically significant for two to five months.  The accumulated impulses 
remain positive and statistically significant in the long term.  This shows that under 
the managed exchange rate regime, the exchange rate shock does not directly 
transmit to other macroeconomic variables, especially the inflation rate.  Under the 
floating exchange rate regime, the nominal exchange rate depreciation directly 
passes through the domestic price level.  However, this difference is largely due to 
the different size of the shocks between two periods.  The upper-left corner graphs of 
IRFs from both figures show the size of the exchange rate shocks.  Observe that two 
graphs show different scales reflecting the size of shocks for each period.  Exchange 
rate shock is much bigger under the free float regime than that of managed exchange 
rate regime.  Under the managed exchange rate regime, exchange rate policy 
effectively limited the size of the exchange rate shocks, and minimized the impact to 
domestic inflation.  The accumulated impulses remain positive and statistically 
significant in the long-term under the free float regime.  The upper-right corner of 
IRF and ARF are the responses of exchange rate to the external shock of inflation 
factors.  As we demonstrated previously by VAR results and Granger causality tests, 
the impact of the inflation shock to the exchange rates are statistically insignificant 
for both periods. 
The last two figures, Figures 9 and 10, show the impulse response functions for 
Japan and Australia.  Exchange rate shocks have no statistically significant impact on 
domestic inflation rates for Japan.  Australian exchange rate shocks have a 
verystatistically insignificant.  
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[Figure 7 (Period 1)] IRF and ARF of Korean for Managed Float Period 
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[Figure 8 (Period 2)] IRF and ARF of Korea for Free Float Period 
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[Figure 9 and Figure 10] Impulse Response Function of Japan and Australia 
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Ⅳ. Conclusion 
 
 
This paper investigated the role of economic fundamentals on exchange rate 
determination of different exchange rate regimes focusing on the Korean economy 
and its comparison to the two benchmark economies of Japan and Australia.  This 
paper found that the economic fundamentals have influenced exchange rates much 
more significantly under the flexible regime than under the managed exchange rate 
regime.  Korean exchange rates under the floating regime are more sensitive to the 
economic fundamentals than those of Japan and Australia.  Exchange rate pass-
through into domestic variables, especially inflation rate, has a smaller impact under 
the floating regime than under the managed regime.  However, the size of the shock 
is much bigger under the free floating regime than that of managed regime.  This 
finding is consistent with the traditional arguments for the managed regime.  In 
short, the movements of the exchange rates under the free floating regime directly 
reflect the underlying economic fundamentals.  
It is true that the exchange rate has become more volatile under the flexible 
exchange rate system than under the managed regime.  While the flexible regime 
may help to promote healthy economic growth in the long-run, the exchange rate 
volatility may prevent foreign investment or stable growth in the short-run.  The 
Korean government needs to pursue an exchange rate policy to reduce short-run 
volatilities of the flexible exchange rate system to promote the stable economic 
growth.  However, we expect that the exchange rate impact will become less 
prominent as the Korean economy matures, as evidenced by comparisons to Japan 
and Australia. 
It is still an open question regarding which exchange rate regime is better for 
economic growth in the long run especially for the developing economies.  My 
future research will expand the current topic to investigate the relationship between 
different exchange rate regimes and other macro economic performance, especially 
economic growth. 
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